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Abstract
In a model of debt crisis caused partly by creditor coordination failure, we show that bailouts that reduce
ex post inefficiency will sometimes enhance the incentives for governments to take costly adjustment effort.
This model helps us understand a debate about the role of the IMF in catalyzing lending to developing
countries.
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1. Introduction
The doctrine of catalytic finance rests on the idea that the provision of official assistance to a
country undergoing a financial crisis spurs other interested parties to take actions that mitigate
the crisis. In particular, it rests on the premise that, under the right conditions, official assistance
and private sector funding are strategic complements. That is, the provision of official assistance
galvanizes the private sector creditors into rolling over short term loans, and thereby alleviating
the funding crisis faced by the debtor country.
Until recently (i.e. before the Argentine default of 2001), catalytic finance was the
cornerstone of the official community’s strategy towards capital account crises. Ghosh et al.
(2002) and Cottarelli and Giannini (2002) are two IMF papers that chronicle the emergence of
the doctrine of catalytic finance and its apparent fall from grace among G7 policy makers. This is
in spite of the fact that, as recently as September 2000, the communique ´ of the International
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www.elsevier.com/locate/econbaseMonetary and Finance Committee – the so-called Prague framework – acknowledges that bthe
combination of catalytic official financing and policy adjustment should allow the country to
regain full market access quickly.Q
What went wrong? Can the demise of the doctrine of catalytic finance be attributed to clear
cut evidence of its ineffectiveness, or is it merely a reflection of the trauma following
Argentina’s default? Does the Argentine episode prove that debtor moral hazard is an inevitable
consequence of catalytic finance, and hence doomed to failure? The empirical evidence cited by
Ghosh et al. (2002) and Cottarelli and Giannini (2002) suggests that catalytic finance has not
been effective. The evidence comes from studies of the effect of IMF intervention on net private
capital flows (there seems to be little increase in net inflows), and on comparisons of initial
projections of IMF assistance as compared to eventual IMF assistance ex post (the eventual
assistance outstrips initial projections).
1
However, two issues make the assessment problematic. There is, first, the question of what
the relevant counterfactual is. In assessing the welfare effects of IMF intervention, the relevant
question is what would have happened had the IMF not intervened. Tracking net capital flows
fails to address the possibility that net outflows of private capital (and hence the severity of
crisis) might have been even worse without IMF intervention.
Second, and more generally, there is no agreed theoretical rationale for catalytic finance that
might assist in formulating the appropriate questions. The problem is especially acute when
assessing the moral hazard implications of IMF intervention. Leaving the Argentine episode
aside, does IMF intervention always exacerbate the moral hazard problem on the part of the
debtor country? The relevant counterfactual here is what the debtor country would have done to
stave off a crisis in the absence of IMF intervention. Would it have tried harder to avoid a crisis if
it knew that the IMF was not there to extend help? Or was the adjustment effort made
manageable only because the IMF’s assistance mitigated the onerous domestic political costs of
adjustment? The idea behind this latter possibility is that without the IMF’s assistance, the
political costs of embarking on an adjustment program would have been so prohibitive that the
debtor government would have chosen to take the relatively ‘‘easier’’ option, and default. So,
which side is correct? Does IMF intervention always exacerbate moral hazard, or could it
sometimes mitigate it?
The importance of addressing the moral hazard implications of IMF assistance is underlined
by the inconclusive debates on how to interpret the evidence from past interventions. Take, for
instance, Eichengreen and Mody’s (2000) finding that IMF loans to a country tend to narrow the
spreads on that country’s debt on the primary market. Cottarelli and Giannini (2002) take issue
with this evidence as an argument in favour of IMF intervention for the reason that
b... the regressions do not control for the change in economic policies that typically
characterizes an IMF-supported program. This means that it is impossible to distinguish
between the decline in the spread that is due to sounder policies, from that arising from the
IMF’s seal of approvalQ [p.28].
The counterargument would be that debtor country policies are endogenous. Even in the
absence of explicit conditionality, IMF assistance affects economic policy by altering the slope
of the tradeoff between the costs of domestic adjustment and the costs of repudiation. Far from
1 See Hovaguimian (2003) for an overview of the empirical evidence. The studies by Corsetti et al. (2002) and Roubini
and Setser (2004) suggest that the evidence is somewhat mixed.
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assessment of IMF assistance should proceed by trying to assess how much of the change in
economic policy can be attributed to IMF assistance. For such an exercise, it is essential to have
a theoretical framework that can account for the endogeneity of adjustment policy.
In fact, the endogeneity problem is more pervasive than we have hinted so far. Up to now, we
have only commented on the endogeneity of debtor country adjustment policy. However, there
are at least three groups of interested parties, namely
! The debtor country
! Private sector creditors
! IMF and other official lenders.
The decisions within each group are endogenous to the actions of the other groups. Thus, for
instance, the private sector creditors will be galvanized to roll-over their short term claims if they
believe that IMF assistance will tip the balance in favour of the debtor country embarking on an
otherwise (politically) infeasible adjustment program. Recognizing its pivotal role, the IMF will
then be willing to incur the costs of intervention. Finally,the debtor country willrecognize that the
virtuous circle described above will only come about if painful domestic adjustment policies are
undertaken. In other words, the actions of all interested parties are strategic complements. Each
party’s action provides incentives for the other parties to take the appropriate action. To use a
rather extravagant metaphor, it is as if every agent is standing on the shoulders of all other agents.
The supporting role of each party is necessary for the participation of the others.
In contrast, we could paint a more pessimistic picture of the strategic interaction between the
creditors, debtor and the IMF. The inability of the IMF to commit not to intervene generates
moral hazard on the part of the debtor country, which fails to take the necessary domestic
adjustment effort. In turn, the creditors take advantage of the IMF’s assistance to bail out of the
country before economic conditions deteriorate. This combination paints a picture in which the
IMF’s assistance is a strategic substitute for the adjustment effort of the debtor and the roll-over
decisions of the private creditors. Far from galvanizing the efforts of the other interested parties,
the IMF’s intervention serves to crowd out those actions that would mitigate the crisis.
In light of the contrasting strategic effects of IMF assistance, we could advance the following
working definition of when catalytic finance is successful.
Working definition. Catalytic financing succeeds when it induces greater adjustment effort by
the debtor and induces a greater incidence of roll-over by the creditors.
Ourworkingdefinitionpointstotheimportanceofthemutuallyreinforcingeffectofadjustment
effort and greater incidence of roll-over by the creditors. It should be contrasted with other related
(butdistinct)notions—suchasthegreaterincidenceofroll-overwithoutgreateradjustmenteffort
by the debtor (a symptom of creditor moral hazard) or the reduction in the probability of default
(which would be consistent with debtor moral hazard). The reduction in default probability would
be a necessary condition for successful catalytic finance, but not sufficient.
2 Our definition is also
related to the issue of the feasibility of an international lender of last resort (Fischer, 1999).
In what follows, we construct a theoretical framework for assessing the success or otherwise
of catalytic finance by constructing a model that treats the actions of creditors, debtor
2 We are grateful to the co-editor and a referee for pointing out the distinct nature of these ideas.
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intertwined. Our model builds on the recently developed literature on global games, in which
short term creditors must decide on whether or not to roll-over claims that are maturing
imminently. The IMF seeks to intervene only when the fundamentals of the debtor country are
sound (based on the basic conditions of the economy and the adjustment effort of the debtor
government), but where there is a danger that short term creditors themselves may not be able to
resolve the collective action problem. The debtor government’s adjustment effort is itself chosen
anticipating the actions of the IMF and the short term creditors.
We identify circumstances under which IMF assistance succeeds in spurring the debtor
country not to slack off in its adjustment effort, and sometimes actually to increase it. The
moral hazard implications of IMF intervention are quite subtle. IMF intervention can
mitigate debtor moral hazard in some cases. For catalytic finance to work, the IMF’s
decision must be strategic complements with the adjustment effort of the decision country
and the roll-over decisions of the private sector creditors. Catalytic finance fails when the
IMF’s decision becomes a strategic substitute for either the debtor country’s adjustment
effort, or the private sector creditors’ roll-over decisions. The ambiguous effect of IMF
assistance on debtor moral hazard has also been studied by Jeanne and Zettelmeyer (2004)
and Cordella and Levy-Yeyati (2004), although both these papers employ a model quite
different from our own.
Our results suggest that catalytic finance is most likely to work when the fundamentals
are quite poor, but not hopelessly so. In such a situation, the existence of IMF assistance
provides just enough of a lifeline for the debtor country to make the necessary adjustment
effort. This, in turn, alters the incentives of the private sector creditors just enough to make
them roll-over their maturing claims. However, our results also suggest that over some
ranges of the fundamentals, the conventional bdebtor moral hazardQ effects may
predominate. In this range, the inability of the IMF to commit to a tough intervention
policy leads to a slackening of effort on the part of the debtor country. Similar results to
ours on the catalytic effect of IMF assistance have been obtained by Penalver (2002) and
Corsetti et al. (in press). We will discuss the related literature in a later section of our
paper.
Our conclusion that catalytic finance can work is at variance with the bPowell doctrineQ on
this issue. The original (Colin) Powell doctrine is the military dictum that one should be selective
in choosing whether to intervene; but once the decision is made to go in, one should employ
boverwhelming forceQ to guarantee a successful outcome. For IMF interventions, the implication
is that if intervention has been decided upon, the size of the assistance should be large enough to
meet the funding gap in full. In this vein, Zettelmeyer (2000) and Jeanne and Wyplosz (2001)
have suggested that any IMF intervention that leaves open the possibility of multiple equilibria
would induce private sector creditors to act so as to undermine the program. Frankel and Roubini
(2001) provide a survey of the arguments.
Our conclusions are rather different. Once we have circumvented the difficulties of predicting
outcomes when there is more than one equilibrium by means of our global game methods, we
find that the Powell doctrine (at least, as applied to IMF interventions) misses the pivotal role
played by the strategic interplay between the actions of the three groups of interested parties—
the debtor, the creditors, and the IMF. Under the right conditions, something less than a full
bailout is sufficient to stave off a default.
We begin by presenting the model in the next section. The solution proceeds in steps in
Sections 3 and 4. In Section 5, we discuss some related literature and how our model could be
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with some reflections on the possible implications of our findings on the debates on the scope
and rationale for IMF lending.
2. Model
A debtor country needs funds to pay its creditors in order to tide itself over to the next period.
It must find funds to pay interest of L on its outstanding long term sovereign debt, and has
amount S of its short term debt maturing immediately. Unless the short term creditors roll-over
their claims, the debtor must also find the money to repay principal of S on these maturing short
term debt. In all, the debtor country faces an immediate funding need of
L þ S S
if proportion S of the short term creditors decline to roll-over. We suppose that there is a
continuum of short term creditors.
In order to meet this funding requirement, the debtor country can draw on available cash of
h
which is the realization of a normally distributed random variable with mean
/ þ e
and variance 1/a. The two variables / and e have the following interpretation.
! The variable / represents the strength of the underlying economic fundamentals of the debtor
country, irrespective of any adjustment effort on its part. The / stands for bfundamentalsQ.
! The variable e represents the increased likelihood of additional cash available to the debtor
government if it embarks on a painful domestic adjustment program (such as fiscal
stringency). The e stands for badjustment effortQ. The adjustment effort is costly for the
debtor country, as will be described later.
For the sake of simplicity, we will suppose that the country’s finances are viable in the long
run provided that h is large enough to cover the interest payment L on the long term loan only.
This means that all creditors (both long term creditors, and those short term creditors who roll-
over) will be repaid. Hence, we will say that the country is fundamentally sound if
LVh
If h is large enough to meet both L and the maturing short term debt S, then there is no
problem. However, if h is in the intermediate range where
LbhbL þ S ð1Þ
then the fate of the country lies in the hands of its short term creditors. If they all roll-over, then h
is large enough to meet the debt payments. However, if sufficiently many of them decline to
roll-over, h is not large enough to avoid default. The consequences of default for all the
S. Morris, H.S. Shin / Journal of International Economics 70 (2006) 161–177 165interested parties will be described in more detail below. By shifting the origin and adjusting the
units, we will normalize the debt repayments L and S so that
L ¼ 0
L þ S ¼ 1
and the variables /, e and h are normalized accordingly.
The final interested party in our model is the IMF. The IMF has the capacity to intervene by
providing additional funds to the debtor country based on its knowledge of the fundamentals /
and adjustment effort e. The IMF’s objective function will be defined so that, provided that the
debtor country is fundamentally sound, it gains by assisting the debtor country fulfil its
obligations to the short term creditors, thereby staving off default.
2.1. Extensive form of the game
We can now describe our model more formally, by supplying the payoffs of all the interested
parties, their sequence of moves and the information available at all points. The game proceeds
as follows.
! Nature draws /; / is common knowledge among all.
! The debtor country chooses adjustment effort e based on its knowledge of /. Once e has been
chosen, it is common knowledge among all.
! The IMF chooses the amount of funding m that is extended to the debtor country based on /
and e. The amount m is announced publicly and hence is common knowledge among all.
! Nature draws h from a normal density with mean /+e and variance 1/a. No-one observes
the true realization of h.
! However, each short term creditor i observes the realization of his signal
xi ¼ h þ ei
where ei is normal with mean 0 and variance 1/b, and where the noise terms ei and ej for
distinct i and j are independent. Thus, a short term creditor’s information consists of the
publicly known variables /, e, m and his private signal xi. Based on this information each
short term creditor decides whether to roll-over or not.
In our model, the long term creditors are passive players. They are called into action only
when the debtor country defaults and cross-default clauses are triggered. Since the long term
creditors play no role in determining whether the country defaults or not, we will confine our
attention to the actions of the short term creditors.
Using our normalization for L and S introduced earlier, and denoting by S as the proportion
of short term creditors that decline to roll-over, the debtor country defaults on its debt if and
only if
h þ mbS
That is, the domestic resources h plus the IMF assistance m is not enough to meet the funding
gap. The short term creditor who declines to roll-over has an investment opportunity that gives
payoff k, where 0bkb1. The short term creditor who rolls over faces an uncertain payoff. If the
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payoff of a short term creditor who rolls over is given by
v h;m;S ðÞ u 1i fh þ mzS
0i fh þ mb S
 
We now turn to the payoff of the debtor country. In order to preserve tractability of the model,
we will define the payoffs of the debtor country as being identical to the payoff of the short term
creditors who roll-over, except for the cost of adjustment effort c(e). Thus, the debtor country’s
payoff is given by
v h;m;S ðÞ   ce ðÞ
where c(˙) is an increasing convex function. This definition of the debtor’s payoff is adopted for
simplicity and neglects some important features. We will return in a later section to discuss how
our analysis can be generalized.
Finally, we come to the IMF’s payoff function. We will suppose that the IMF’s interests
coincide with the short term creditors who decide to roll-over their claims, except for two
qualifications. First, the IMF seeks to intervene only when the debtor country’s economy is
fundamentally sound (i.e. when hz0). Second, the IMF bears a cost bm in providing the
assistance m, where bN0 is a positive constant. The IMF’s payoff function is thus given by
w h;m;S ðÞ u
v h;m;S ðÞ   bm if hz0
  bm if hb0
 
ð2Þ
It is worth noting that the IMF’s interests coincide with both the debtor country and the short
term creditors whoroll-over,except for thefact that theshort term creditors andthe debtor country
benefit from the IMF’s assistance even when the debtor is not fundamentally sound (i.e. when
hb0). In this case, any assistance by the IMF constitutes a straight transfer to the short term
creditors.Ouranalysiscanbeextendedtoalternativepayoffspecificationsfortheinterestedparties
providedthatthesocialwelfarefunctionandtheobjectivefunctionfortheIMF(ifdifferent)canbe
specified explicitly; we discuss some alternative payoff specifications in Section 5.1.
The main consequence of the simplified payoffs assumed here is that it minimizes the
distributional issues between debtor and creditors, and we can concentrate on the efficiency
aspect of IMF intervention. However, since bdistributional issuesQ is a euphemism for default,
we are missing an important element of the discussion on sovereign debt. Subject to this
qualification, we examine the equilibrium that arises from our model.
3. Equilibrium
Our purpose is to gauge the moral hazard implications of the IMF assistance, and the
interplay between the IMF’s assistance and short term capital flows. As such, our main focus
will be on the adjustment effort e of the debtor country and the determination of the IMF’s
assistance m and its relationship with the roll-over decision of the short term creditors.
3.1. Roll-over by short term creditors
In solving the subgame that begins with Nature’s draw of h (the fourth stage of our extensive
form game), we employ global game methods used in our earlier work on currency attacks and
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decisions of the short term creditors.
A strategy for short term creditor i is a decision rule which maps each realization of xi to an
action (i.e. to roll-over the loan, or not). An equilibrium of the subgame is a profile of strategies
– one for each short term creditor – such that a creditor’s strategy maximizes his expected payoff
conditional on the information available, when all other creditors are following the strategies in
the profile. We will confine our attention to equilibria in switching strategies in which a creditor
rolls over whenever his estimate of h is higher than some given threshold level. We will
comment below on why this is not a restrictive assumption in our model. Let us define
yu/ þ e
to be the ex ante mean of h.
When short term creditor i observes the realization of the signal xi, his posterior distribution
of h is normal with mean
niu
ay þ bxi
a þ b
ð3Þ
and precision a+b. When creditors use a switching strategy, they have a threshold level n (the
dswitching pointT) for their switching strategies, and roll-over the loan if and only if the private
signal x is greater than
x n;y ðÞ u
a þ b
b
n  
a
b
y: ð4Þ
3.2. Critical value of fundamentals
The critical value of h at which the country is on the margin of crisis is when h+m=S , where
S is the proportion of creditors who decline to roll-over resulting from the switching strategy
around n. We denote by h* the critical state h at which the debtor country defaults. The
incidence of foreclosure S is given by the mass of creditors who have received a signal below the
marginal signal x. Hence S ¼ U
ﬃﬃﬃ
b
p
x   h* ðÞ
  
; where U(˙) is the cumulative distribution
function for the standard normal. Since h*+m=S , we have
h4 þ m ¼ U
ﬃﬃﬃ
b
p
x   h4 ðÞ
  
¼ U
ﬃﬃﬃ
b
p a þ b
b
n  
a
b
y   h4
     
¼ U
a
ﬃﬃﬃ
b
p n   y ðÞ þ
ﬃﬃﬃ
b
p
n   h4 ðÞ
  
: ð5Þ
This gives us our first equation in terms of n and h*.
For our second equation, we appeal to the fact that at the switching point n, a creditor is
indifferent between rolling over and foreclosing. The payoff to foreclosure is k, while the
expected payoff to rolling over is the probability that the country does not default. Since the
debtor country avoids default whenever hzh*, and since the conditional density over h is
normal with mean n and precision a+b, this indifference condition is given by
1   U
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
a þ b
p
h4   n ðÞ
  
¼ k ð6Þ
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h4   n ¼
U 1 1   k ðÞ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
a þ b
p : ð7Þ
This gives us our second equation. From this pair of equations, we can solve for our two
unknowns, h* and n. Solving for h*, we have
h4 þ m ¼ U
a
ﬃﬃﬃ
b
p h4   y þ U 1 k ðÞ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
a þ b
p
a
    
:
 
ð8Þ
The critical state h* is obtained as the intersection between a cumulative normal distribution
with mean y   U 1 k ðÞ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
aþb
p
a and precision a
2/b, with a straight line of slope 1 with intercept m.
Eq. (8) has a unique solution if the expression on the right hand side has a slope that is less
than one everywhere. The slope of the right hand side is given by /da=
ﬃﬃﬃ
b
p
where / is the
density of the standard normal evaluated at the appropriate point. Since /V1=
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2p
p
; a sufficient
condition for a unique solution for h* is given by
a
ﬃﬃﬃ
b
p V
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2p
p
ð9Þ
Since a is the precision of the ex ante distribution of h, while b is the precision of the
creditors’ signals, condition (9) is satisfied whenever the private signals are precise enough
relative to the underlying uncertainty. When Eq. (9) holds, there is a unique equilibrium in
switching strategies. It turns out that Eq. (9) is also sufficient for uniqueness of equilibrium in
any class of strategies—not simply the switching strategies. Condition (9) is necessary and
sufficient for there to be a unique dominance-solvable equilibrium (see Morris and Shin, 2004).
3.3. Limiting case
In order to keep the analysis tractable enough to investigate moral hazard effects, we will be
interested in the limiting case when the private signals of the short term creditors become very
precise. This corresponds to the case where bYl. From Eq. (8), the failure point h* satisfies
h4 þ mYUU  1 k ðÞ
  
¼ k
so that, in the limit,
h4 ¼ k   m ð10Þ
The fact that the payoff parameter k and IMF assistance m are related in this manner is a
consequence of our payoff normalization, and should not be read too literally. Of more
importance is the observation that m determines whether the critical value of fundamentals h*
allows inefficient crises or not. When kNm, we have h*N0, so that there are states between 0
and h* at which the debtor country defaults even when it is fundamentally sound.
Eq. (10) also shows that inefficiencies may persist even when the private signals xi now
reveals what the underlying state h is. The key to understanding this result is to note that
strategic uncertainty – uncertainty over the actions of other short term creditors – is not resolved
even when the private signal becomes very precise.
One way to show this is to ask what is the subjective probability distribution over S , the
proportion of creditors who foreclose. From the point of view of any creditor, the equilibrium S
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about the degree of strategic uncertainty in terms of the shape of the density over [0,1]. For
instance, if the density is a degenerate spike at 0, this would suggest that there is no strategic
uncertainty, since no-one forecloses. Similarly if the density is the degenerate spike at 1, then
everyone forecloses, so that again, there is no strategic uncertainty. However, if the density is
more diffuse, then there is uncertainty over what the other creditors will do. For the case where
bYl, it turns out that the subjective density for S held by a player at the equilibrium switching
point is given by the uniform density. Since the uniform density is the most diffuse of all
densities over the unit interval, this suggests that strategic uncertainty is at is greatest when
bYl. The reader may consult our survey paper of global games (Morris and Shin, 2003,
section 2) for more details. The analysis of this limiting case demonstrates quite starkly how
even when information concerning the underlying fundamentals becomes very precise, the
strategic uncertainty concerning the actions of other players may, nevertheless, be very severe. It
is the interplay between these two types of uncertainty that determines the equilibrium outcome,
and this interplay can be quite subtle.
4. When does catalytic finance work?
Our solution for the critical value of h at which debtor default is triggered can now be used in
evaluating the decision of the IMF in deciding on the size of the assistance m, and the extent of
adjustment effort e exerted by the debtor country.
Consider the IMF’s decision. It knows the fundamentals / and the adjustment effort e, and
hence knows that h is normally distributed with mean y=/+e and variance 1/a. From Eq. (2)
the IMF’s expected payoff is given by
1   U
ﬃﬃﬃ
a
p
h4   y ðÞ ðÞ   bm if h*z0
1   U  
ﬃﬃﬃ
a
p
y ðÞ   bm if h*b 0
 
¼ 1   U
ﬃﬃﬃ
a
p
max 0;h4 ðÞ   y ðÞ
  
  bm
¼ 1   U
ﬃﬃﬃ
a
p
max 0;k   m ðÞ   y ðÞ
  
  bm ð11Þ
where the last equation follows from the fact that h*=k m. The IMF chooses m to maximize
Eq. (11). Note that when yYl, or when yY l, the optimal choice is m=0. In other words,
when y is either very large or very small, the IMF chooses not to intervene. When y is very large,
the debtor’s economy is very strong, and no assistance is needed. When y is very small, the
economy is not fundamentally sound, and hence assistance is wasted. The optimal choice of m is
largest for intermediate values of y, when the economy is weak, but not hopelessly so.
4.1. Solution in a limiting case
We will assume that the cost parameter b is small relative to the benefits of intervention.
The expected payoff given by Eq. (11) was obtained as the limiting expression when bYl.
We can obtain a further simplification and obtain an explicit solution for the IMF’s decision
problem if we further take the limit as aYl. In other words, we take two limits, the first
with respect to b, and then with respect to a. When aYl, the ex ante distribution of h
becomes a degenerate spike around its mean y. In this case, the IMF’s information is a very
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payoff tends to the discontinuous limit:
1   bm if yN0 and yNk   m
  bm if yV0o r yVk   m
 
Thus, for large but finite values of a, and for a cost parameter b that is small enough, the
optimal choice of m as a function of y can be derived approximately as the value of m that sets
k m y=0, provided that y lies between 0 and k. In other words, the optimal value of m
satisfies:
m4 y ðÞ g
0i f yb0
k   y if 0Vybk
0i f yzk
8
<
:
ð12Þ
This solution makes intuitive sense. Whenever the debtor country is fundamentally sound
(yz0), but where the coordination problem among the short term creditors leads to default
(ybk), the IMF intervenes to provide assistance to the debtor country. The amount of assistance
is just enough to ensure that the sum of domestically available resources and IMF assistance is
sufficient to stave off default—that is, y+m=k.
Given the IMF’s decision rule (12), we can now address the issue of debtor country moral
hazard. We maintain the assumption that a is large, so that y=/+e provides a good estimate of
h. In this case, anticipating the intervention of the IMF whenever 0V/+ebk, the payoff
function for the debtor country is given by
1   ce ðÞ if / þ ez0
  ce ðÞ otherwise
 
ð13Þ
The debtor country chooses adjustment effort e to maximize this expression. Let us consider
the special case in which the cost function is quadratic, so that c(e)=e
2. Then the optimal choice
of e is given by
e4 / ðÞ ¼
  / if   1V/b0
0 otherwise
 
ð14Þ
Thus, adjustment effort is maximized when /= 1, and diminishes linearly in /.
4.2. Moral hazard implications of IMF assistance
Let us now compare the adjustment effort of a debtor country in a world without IMF
assistance—that is, a world in which m is set equal to zero. In this case, the critical state h*i s
equal to k. In the limiting case where aYl, the expected payoff of the debtor country as a
function of its adjustment effort is given by
1   ce ðÞ if / þ ezk
  ce ðÞ otherwise
 
ð15Þ
The difference between Eqs. (15) and (13) is that the hurdle that must be met for /+e in
order to avoid default is higher without IMF intervention. Without the IMF, the debtor country
must have /+e be at least as large as k. In contrast, with IMF intervention, the hurdle is lower.
The debtor country need only have /+e be at least as large as 0.
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ˆ e e4 / ðÞ ¼ k   / if   1   k ðÞ V/bk
0 otherwise
 
ð16Þ
Comparing (14) and (16) now allows us to compare the extent of adjustment effort with and
without IMF intervention. We can see that adjustment effort cannot be ranked unambiguously
across the two regimes. Adjustment effort depends on the strength of the underlying
fundamentals /. When / is low, but not hopelessly so, adjustment effort is higher with the
IMF, than without. In the interval where  1V/b (1 k), the debtor country puts in more
adjustment effort when it anticipates IMF assistance, as compared to when there is no IMF
assistance. The debtor country anticipates the additional assistance that the IMF will provide to
push it over the threshold, and puts in adjustment effort that is just sufficient to stave off default.
Without IMF intervention, the adjustment effort would be too onerous for the debtor country,
and the country puts in no adjustment effort whatsoever, and defaults. Thus, in the interval where
 1V/b (1 k), the anticipation of IMF assistance increases adjustment effort.
In contrast, the interval where  (1 k)V/bk is the region where the standard argument on
moral hazard of IMF bailouts takes hold. In this region, the anticipation of IMF assistance makes
the debtor country less willing to incur costly adjustment effort. In this region, the debtor country
is quite capable of avoiding default even without IMF assistance. But, knowing that the IMF will
put in additional resources, the debtor country slacks off.
4.3. Successful catalytic finance
Our working definition of successful catalytic finance has been that it should induce both
greater adjustment effort by the debtor and a greater incidence of roll-over by the creditors. The
effect of IMF assistance on debtor moral hazard has been discussed above. The effect of IMF
assistance on creditor roll-over decisions is much simpler, at least in the limiting case that we
have focused on in this paper. The equilibrium in our model is characterized by switching
strategies on the part of the creditors where they roll-over provided that the signal is higher than
some threshold value. In the limit as private information becomes infinitely precise, the
threshold value of the signal coincides with the threshold value of the fundamentals. Hence, the
incidence of roll-over is fully determined by the threshold value h*. In the additional limiting
case where aYl, the IMF has full information of the underlying fundamentals and is able to
set assistance so that h*=0. There are no inefficient crises. In contrast, without IMF assistance,
we have h*=kN0. Thus, the effect of IMF assistance is to increase the incidence of roll-over
decisions in those states where roll-over would be efficient.
Thus, taking both the debtor adjustment effort and creditor roll-over decisions together, we
can conclude that catalytic financing succeeds precisely in those states where debtor effort is
higher than in the case without IMF assistance. In our simplified model, successful catalytic
financing coincides with reduction in debtor moral hazard.
5. Extensions and related literature
There is a basic trade-off at the heart of many policy discussions between the ex post
incentive to inject liquidity to prevent a financial crisis (perhaps caused by coordination failure
of creditors) and the ex ante moral hazard that the anticipation of such intervention might cause.
This trade-off is central to discussions of both domestic banking regulation and the international
S. Morris, H.S. Shin / Journal of International Economics 70 (2006) 161–177 172financial architecture. Eichengreen et al. (2003) is a recent, comprehensive review of the
current debates. Our paper offers one stylized model that generates that trade-off and suggests
a way to frame the debate about catalytic finance. These issues have been studied in many
different models (e.g., Jeanne, 2004). Like our paper, Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), Rochet
and Vives (2004) and recent work of Corsetti et al. (in press) use global games (coordination
games with a small amount of uncertainty) as a way of pinning down the equilibrium amount
of inefficient coordination failure and add on a prior effort decision by some actor. Of these,
the paper by Corsetti et al. (in press) is closest in spirit and subject matter to our paper.
The main difference between our paper and that of Corsetti et al. is that they adopt a
global game in which all players move simultaneously, but where the IMF is a large
player relative to the other creditors (extending Corsetti et al., 2004). The size and
information precision of the IMF then determine the nature of the strategic interactions of
the creditors. The switching point of the creditors’ strategy then shifts, leading to similar
effects to those examined here.
However, there are many different modelling choices to make. Here, we review some of these
modelling choices and how each might affect the conclusions of our analysis. Our focus is on
alternative assumptions on the payoffs of the three types of agents in our game, government,
IMF and creditors. Then we discuss how our analysis would change as we vary the rules of the
game. In doing so, we will see how other issues could be incorporated into our analysis and how
our work relates to other approaches.
5.1. Changing payoffs
5.1.1. Changing the government objective
We assumed that the government cares only about the probability of a crisis and the cost of
effort in preventing the crisis. But our qualitative conclusions rely only on the assumption that
there is a discrete jump in government utility depending on whether a crisis can or cannot be
averted. We can easily add in that the government obtains additional benefit from improving
fundamentals through costly effort, independent of whether a payments crisis is prevented. For
example, suppose that the government’s utility were given by
v h;m;l ðÞ þ h h ðÞ   ce ðÞ ;
where the additional term h(˙) is a concave function of h. Now in our full information limit, there
would be a background level of optimal effort,
ˆ e e / ðÞ ¼ argmax
e
h / þ e ðÞ   ce ðÞ ;
that the government would choose in absence of the incentive to prevent a payment crisis. In the
full information limit (where bYl and aYl), the optimal policy in the absence of the IMF
would be
  /; if   /Nˆ e e / ðÞ and 1 þ h 0 ðÞ   c   / ðÞ Nh / þ ˆ e e / ðÞ ðÞ   c ˆ e e / ðÞ ðÞ
ˆ e e / ðÞ ; otherwise
:
 
With IMF assistance, the optimal policy would be
k   /; if k   /Nˆ e e / ðÞ and 1 þ h k ðÞ   c k   / ðÞ Nh / þ ˆ e e / ðÞ ðÞ   c ˆ e e / ðÞ ðÞ
ˆ e e / ðÞ ; otherwise
:
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some range of (relatively good) fundamentals and create a catalytic effect in some range of
(relatively bad) fundamentals.
5.1.2. Changing the IMF objective
We assumed that the IMF only obtained utility from preventing a crisis if fundamentals were
above 0. This was a reduced form way of capturing the idea that IMF only wants to help solvent
but illiquid countries. Suppose instead we assumed that the IMF’s objective was to maximize
v h;m;l ðÞ   bm
but they face a constraint that the probability of being repaid in the long run must be greater than
some threshold la(0,1); and suppose that they would get repaid in the long run only if h were
greater than 0. Then the IMF’s objective would be to maximize
1   U
ﬃﬃﬃ
a
p
k   m   y ðÞ
  
  bm
subject to the constraint if m is positive, we must have
1   U
ﬃﬃﬃ
a
p
  y ðÞ
  
zl:
As aYl, the IMF’s optimal policy will again be to set
m4 y ðÞ g
0i f yb0
k   y if 0Vybk
0i f yzk
:
8
<
:
ð17Þ
5.1.3. Changing the creditors’ objective
We assumed that creditors care about getting repaid and that getting repaid depends only on
whether the number of creditors rolling over their debt exceeds a stochastic threshold; we also
assumed the creditors who declined to roll-over were guaranteed a return k independent of what
others chose to do. Goldstein and Pauzner’s (2005) analysis of bank runs contains a finer
modelling of creditor repayment in the type of informational setting in this paper. The threshold
nature of the unique equilibrium is robust to this detail.
5.2. Changing the game
Our assumptions about information and order of moves are also clearly somewhat arbitrary.
Actions of government, IMF and creditors are interwoven. The IMF might be more informed
than the creditors about fundamentals. We believe the basic conclusion of model will be robust
to alternative specifications. The key driving force of our analysis was that the IMF wants to
intervene at intermediate levels of fundamentals, not when fundamentals are very bad or very
good. This non-monotonicity will imply an ambiguous relationship between bailouts and moral
hazard in many models.
1. Signalling. We assumed that the IMF knows no more than the creditors do. If the IMF knows
more about the economy than private creditors do, then clearly its funding decision has the
potential to catalyze lending not merely by its direct effect on creditors’ probability of getting
repaid, but indirectly via the information that is revealed in equilibrium. This indirect
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agreement plays a certification role independent of the size of loans that are provided. This
channel was excluded from our analysis. This channel could be incorporated but it is
important to note that under our (or any natural) assumptions on the IMF payoffs, their
behavior would be a non-monotonic function of their information, since the IMF would like
to intervene for intermediate levels of fundamentals and not for extreme levels.
3 Corsetti et al.
(in press) allow the IMF to have independent information about fundamentals but remove the
signalling role of IMF policy by having the IMF and creditors move simultaneously. Some
empirical evidence is presented in Mody and Saravia (2003).
2. Commitment. We assumed that the IMF chooses a sequentially rational action, after observing
the government’s effort decision but before the creditors’ action choices. In particular, this
implies that funding cannot be made contingent on the effort decision and that IMF cannot
optimally design its intervention to minimize moral hazard. The idea of having crisis funding
conditional on earlier actions of the government occurs in both policy discussions and earlier
models (see Jeanne, 2004). It would be a natural extension to incorporate these important
effects into this model, although in this case, it would also be natural to have imperfect
observation of government effort by the IMF.
3. Endogenous financing. We assumed that there was a fixed amount of outstanding debt,
exogenously given. In the banking model of Rochet and Vives (2004), depositors choose
whether to make long run or short run deposits. In the financial architecture model of Jeanne
(2004), the government decides whether to issue short or long term debt. Clearly, the
endogeneity of the debt overhang is potentially important, especially when short run debt is
playing a role in disciplining behavior. Moreover, much of the concern in policy circles about
IMF bailouts is about moral hazard for lenders rather that the government. The possibility of
an ex post bailout may induce private lenders to lend to a country that otherwise would not be
creditworthy. This alternative form of moral hazard could also be incorporated in the model.
We hope that the clean benchmark model of this paper highlights when we should expect the
moral hazard implications of ex post bailouts to be ambiguous. The model focuses on one
channel by which ex post bailouts generate ex ante moral hazard. However, it is easy to see how
to build other mechanisms into this benchmark model and we expect the general conclusion that
there is no simple relationship between bailouts and ex ante moral hazard to be robust (for
example, the argument of Corsetti et al. (in press) works through different channels but comes to
a similarly ambiguous conclusion).
6. Concluding remarks
Catalytic finance can work in principle. However, the bwindow of effectivenessQ may be quite
narrow. For catalytic finance to work, it must succeed in spurring the debtor country not to slack
off in its adjustment effort. Also, it must succeed in shifting the incentives of the private sector
creditors to roll-over their claims. For catalytic finance to work, the IMF’s decision must be
3 Two models look at signalling in closely related contexts. In the dynamic model of Corsetti et al. (2004), a large
player moves first, and his action influences the actions of a continuum of small players both directly, via the strategic
complementarities, and indirectly via signalling. In Angeletos et al. (2003), a government is setting an interest rate prior
to the actions of the small traders. In the latter work, the non-monotonicity of the government’s optimal action in the
absence of signalling makes signalling very inefficient and sometime self-defeating in equilibrium.
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decisions of the private sector creditors. Catalytic finance fails when the IMF’s decision becomes
a strategic substitute for either the debtor country’s adjustment effort, or the private sector
creditors’ roll-over decisions.
Our model also suggests that the appropriate measure of the effect on creditor incentives is
not the raw net capital flows as such, but rather the roll-over decisions of the short term creditors.
As we have emphasized in the model, the active players that generate the greatest degree of
spillover effects on other players are the short term creditors. It is they who determine the size of
the funding gap most directly through their roll-over decisions. The long-term creditors are
essentially passive players who are brought into action only when default happens and cross-
default clauses are triggered. More empirical work is called for in examining the behavior of
short term claim holders and how this roll-over decision is affected by IMF intervention.
Marchesi (2003), in one of the few studies on this issue, finds evidence that IMF intervention
does, indeed, induce short term creditors to roll-over.
By means of a simple limiting case of a creditor roll-over game using the techniques of
global games, we have seen that catalytic finance can work. It is most likely to succeed when
the fundamentals are quite poor, but not hopelessly so. In such a situation, the existence of
IMF assistance provides just enough of a lifeline for the debtor country to make the necessary
adjustment effort. This, in turn, alters the incentives in the game among private sector creditors
enough to make them roll-over. Much still remains to be done. The results reported in our
paper have been for a limiting case chosen for analytical tractability. The general solution
away from the limit may display richer behaviour that has not been captured here.
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